The Religious Transformation of Secular Ethics

Authors Note: This was written for a comparative religious ethics class a few years ago. To be honest, I've completely forgotten what the original prompt was, the best I can do is that it was arguing that all ethics are religious in some way or another

For quite some time now we have thought of the secular and of the religious as being separate, as antonyms. However, Fascing and Dechant argue that even though modern moralities appear to be secular, they are heavily influenced by the religious moral stories that came before them leading them to conclude that “In this sense there appears to be a religious dimension to every morality, no matter how secular it appears”.[1] This raises the question of in what manner seemingly secular moralities can be said to have a religious dimension. The instances of religious influence on secular morality can be seen in two ways: in their underlying motivation and in their mechanical practice.

            The intent of secular ethics was to create systems devoid of any religious influence. Indeed, Kant’s goal with his categorical imperative was to do just that, create a system based entirely on pure reason. A utilitarian system is essentially of the same nature, devoid of God and religion it’s goal is namely one of a secular humanism placing the good in terms of human happiness. How could it be that these systems whose mechanics contain no God, no tenets of otherworldliness whatsoever be based on some religious perspective?  I argue that it is not in the construction of these systems where we find the influence of religion; instead it is in the assumed necessity under which they are constructed.

            French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre has chided secular ethics in his work Existentialism is a Humanism for attempting to take God out of the equation and leave everything else the same, stating that “The existentialist, on the contrary, thinks it very distressing that God does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a heaven of ideas disappears along with Him…”[2] The word “distressing” is the most important word in the sentence. Granted, we are not all atheistic existentialists, however one would be hard pressed to find an individual who has not experienced the feeling that Sartre alludes to at some point in their lives. It is because of that feeling of distress that creates the aforementioned “assumed necessity” of all morality, including secular ethics. It needs to be said that an assumed necessity is not in itself, religious. However it will be shown later that the assumed necessity is the impetus for the religious transformation of our relationships to certain values.

            Where does this assumption of necessity stem from? Why does this phenomenon of abandonment, as Sartre would call it, terrify us so? The answer is rooted in the assumption made by most world religions and some secular theorists that mankind is essentially bad (evil, impure, imperfect, pathetic) and must conform to some external reality (Christians must make their will conform to God’s divine will, Hindus conform their atman to the Brahman, Taoists conform their Chi to the Tao, and so on). Atheist and secular political theorist Thomas Hobbes has argued that “in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.”[3] Note the emotion elicited in the words “quarrel”, “competition”, “diffidence”, and “glory”. The assumption made by these systems is that without them mankind would dissolve to chaos. As Hobbes said, “…men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all”.[4]

            It is here were we connect secular morality to religiosity. Fascing and Dechant state that “…the word ‘religion’ comes from the Latin religare, which means ‘to tie or bind’. It expresses our sense of being ‘tied and bound’ by relations of obligation to whatever powers we believe govern our destiny and secure our way of life…”.[5] It is at this point that we begin the religious transformation of values that was referred to earlier. We allow ourselves to be “tied and bound” by a moral system, to give up a degree of freedom to an “overawing” institution (community, church, or government) because to not would be to risk civilization collapsing in war, chaos and amoralism because of our assumed Hobbesian nature. The question of whether or not civilization would indeed collapse without some overawing moral system/institution matters not, what does matter is what we believe is going to happen.

            The religious nature of seemingly secular moral systems can also be observed through the normalizing function of their corresponding institutions. Religions frequently employ rituals that Fascing and Dechant describe as “…a way of life that assures that these powers will be on their side.”[6] This is no different than any secular institution with a moral dimension. Take the judiciary for example. Upon reflection it becomes quite clear that the process of a criminal trial resembles very much a religious ritual: the participants dress in their Sunday best, the judge wears a ceremonial robe and wields a symbolic gavel, and it follows a strict procedure. Even the language we use in relation to criminal trials is religious in nature: people rejoicing at the fact that the law is “on our side” – an almost verbatim reference to Fascing and Dechant’s description of the purpose of religious ritual. Of course the example breaks down when one takes into account the admitted fallibility of the courts (as evinced by the appeals system) whereas religious rituals are thought of as absolute and infallible.

            Another example of a kind of religion thinly disguised as secular ritual (keeping with the theme of Hobbes and deference to an awesome leviathan) is the presidential inauguration. The president is often seen (rightly or wrongly) as the moral compass of the nation. People come from all over the country to witness such an event, people sing songs, recite poems, and play their instruments for the incoming president and when the swearing in finally occurs it is administered by the chief justice in his ceremonial robe where they lead the president in the reciting the symbolic oath of office. At some point in the ceremony the pledge of allegiance is taken by all in attendance, a pledge that essentially functions as a kind of national prayer.  

            We have seen how secular moralities demonstrate their religiosity through the franticness of their construction. We find mankind more than willing to give itself up to an external force, more than willing to bind itself if it would act as shelter against our own terrified imaginings of what life would be life if we did not do so. Both secular and religious moralities, it seems, share a profound distrust in the individuals’ ability to decide morality for itself.  We have also seen how our frantic desperation is made clear when our secular moralities manifest themselves in concrete, observable forms whether it is the pomp and circumstance of the criminal trial or what can only be described as the group transference of the presidential inauguration. Religion could be described as a psychology, a mindset for making sense of the world around us and as much as we try to deny it, it continues to influence our modern moralities no matter how secular they may appear.

Works Cited

Fascing, Darrell J., and Dell Dechant. Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach. 1st ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001. Print.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Revised Student Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism and Human Emotions. 1. New York, NY: Kensington Publishing Corp., 1985. Print.

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[1] Fascing and Dechant 14

[2] Sartre 22

[3] Hobbes

[4] Hobbes

[5] Fascing and Dechant 11

[6] Fascing and Dechant 12